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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent spread of online disinformation has been profound and has played a central 
role in the growth of populist sentiments around the world.   Facilitating its 
progression have been politically and economically motivated culprits who have 
ostensibly taken advantage of the digital freedoms available to them.  At the heart of 
these freedoms lie social media organisations that only a few years earlier techno-
optimists were identifying as catalysts of an enhanced digital democracy.  In order to 
curtail the erosion of information policy reform will no doubt be essential (Freedman, 
2018).  The UK’s Disinformation and ‘fake news’ Report (DCMSC of the House of 
Commons, 2019) and Cairncross Review (Cairncross, 2019), and the European 
Commission’s Report on Disinformation (2018) are three recent examples seeking to 
investigate how precisely such reform policy might be implemented.  Just as 
important is how social media organisations take on more responsibility and apply 
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self-regulating mechanisms that stifle disinformation across their platforms 
(something the aforementioned reports identify).  Doing so will go a long way in 
restoring legitimacy in these significant institutions.  Facebook (which includes 
Instagram and Whatsapp), is the largest social media organisation in the world and 
must primarily bear the burden of this responsibility.  The purpose of this paper is to 
offer a descriptive account of Facebook’s public announcements regarding how it 
tackles disinformation and fake news.  Based on a qualitative content analysis 
covering the period November 16th 2016 – March 4th 2019, this paper will set out 
some groundwork on how to hold social media platforms more accountable for how 
they handle disinformation.  
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Facebook, social media, communications policy, disinformation, fake news, post-
truth, misinformation, qualitative content analysis, populism  
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INTRODUCTION 
Liberal democracies, political systems with free elections and basic liberties, 
are increasingly pushed toward illiberal, populist tendencies (Isaac and Rose, 2018).  
These are tendencies of a divisive and systemic global new order (Fukuyama, 2018) 
in which the role of social media has been significant (see Flew 2017, for a discussion 
on where media technologies might be leading us culturally, economically, politically 
and socially).  Social media, once thought of as harbingers of digitized public spheres, 
are increasingly used by partisan tribal communities to selectively expose and share 
their own populist ideals.   
Populist sentiments are often elicited through online disinformation by actors 
wishing to take advantage of the changing political and social landscape.  These 
include extreme ideological groups, foreign agents, or actors simply wishing to make 
profits from unsuspected users.  Online disinformation is currently one of the most 
pressing challenges of the digital age (Bennett and Livingston, 2018).  Policy reform 
effectively overseeing online disinformation will no doubt alleviate the erosion of 
social media and curb escalating cynicism toward news media content (Freedman, 
2018).  Indeed, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO and founder, has admitted that the 
Internet needs new rules curtailing the power internet companies have over speech 
(Zuckerberg, 2019).  Across different countries and continents, policy reform is 
already being drafted or amended.  Just as important is how social media 
organisations take on more responsibility and apply self-regulating mechanisms that 
stifle disinformation across their platforms.  
The purpose of this paper is to offer a descriptive account of Facebook’s 
public announcements on how it tackles online disinformation.  Based on a qualitative 
content analysis we will set out some groundwork on Facebook’s inner workings of 
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how it fights back against online disinformation.  To consider this, we start by 
unpacking the conceptual and theoretical framework relating to populism and the 
crisis of democracy before turning our attention to policy issues, online 
disinformation and Facebook.  
 
POPULISM AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 
Donald Trump’s rise to political power in the US, the upsurge of the 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the increased influence of the French 
National Rally and the UK’s Brexit vote have taken many by surprise.  Indeed, as 
Choy suggests (2018: 752), “reliance on self-reported data, the potential bias of using 
landline numbers, the lack of appropriate sampling frames, and a spiral of silence 
effects”, might explain current limitations in predicting both votes and ideological 
attitudes.  Yet the rise of (mainly right-wing) populism has been a threat to Western 
democracies at least since the 1990s and has intensified after the 2008 global financial 
crisis (Norris and Inglehart, 2019).  The different manifestations of right-wing 
populism share a common feature: they attack or even compromise the core elements 
of democratic societies such as the separation of powers, protection of minorities, or 
the rule of law (Fitzi, Mackert and Bryan, 2018).  Left-wing populism has also been 
on the rise (see Mouffe, 2018).  This has been particularly the case in the 
Mediterranean countries of Greece, Spain and Portugal that were hit hard by the 
banking crisis and were imposed neo-liberal austerity measures. Populisms of the 
political left include SYRIZA in Greece, which went into power in 2015, Podemos in 
Spain, Jean-Luc Melenchon, a far-left candidate who did very well in the French 
presidential election of 2017, Bernie Sanders in the US, but also the Jeremy Corbyn 
movement in the UK. The reasons for the electoral successes of populist parties vary 
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widely, but Inglehart and Norris (2016) attempted to group them into two camps: first, 
the economic inequality perspective, which is in fact the most widely held view of 
mass support for populism; second, the cultural backlash thesis, which suggests that 
support for populist parties is not a purely economic phenomenon but it is in large 
part a reaction against progressive cultural shifts. The authors propose that cultural 
values, combined with several social and demographic factors, provide the most 
consistent explanation for voting support for populist parties. 
Flew and Iosifidis illustrate in the introduction of this International 
Communication Gazette special issue what populism is within liberal democracies.  
Moffitt (2016) argues that populism is exercised across various political and cultural 
contexts and calls for a rethinking of the concept, which may not be based just on the 
classic divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, to incorporate its shifting 
relationship to political representation, its global nature, and its reliance on new media 
technologies.  This latter point may help us understand why populism has seemingly 
spread so rapidly across the globe at a time when media pervades political life and 
social media networks are increasingly used as tools by populist politicians to get into 
power.  In an elegant attempt to clarify the notion of populist philosophy in the 
European context, Mudde (2007) suggested that the philosophy is a loose set of 
notions that have in common three core features: anti-establishment (populism 
reflects ordinary people as against the ‘corrupt’ establishment); authoritarianism 
(populism depicts resentment with existing political authorities, vested economic 
interests and big media firms); and nativism (populist discourse promotes nativism or 
xenophobic nationalism). The volume by Fitzi, Mackert and Bryan (2018) offers 
critical views on the debate on populism from the perspectives of political economy 
and the analysis of critical historical events, the links of analyses of populism with 
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social movement mobilisation, the significance of 'superfluous populations' in the rise 
of populism and an analysis of the exclusionary character of populism from the 
perspective of the theory of social closure.  
As may be gathered from the above brief discussion populism has a broad 
meaning and has assumed a multitude of forms. This article is organised around the 
key themes that are pertinent to contemporary populism and its links to today’s media 
landscape. The existing literature, while growing, does not as yet sufficiently consider 
the media-centred shifts occurring across politics and how the latter is increasingly 
reshaped due to new and social media’s influence. We attempt to understand populist 
leaders’ nuanced adaption of social media networks and strategies as a core factor in 
the spread of the populist phenomenon. By doing so, we ask a controversial question: 
does populism represent a threat to democracy? While some politicians and media 
outlets present it as dangerous to the US, Europe, and Latin America, others hail it as 
the fix for broken democracies (Moffitt, 2016). Further, what is populism’s 
relationship to the substantive democratic value of a political programme? We 
appreciate that issues about populism’s connection to democracy are not 
straightforward but need to be considered under specific political practice and actions. 
However, this study contends that ‘post-truth’ in politics is one of the drivers of 
populism and a threat to democracy (Iosifidis and Andrews, 2019). 
 
POLICY ISSUES AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Recently, the social media has facilitated interactive communications between 
the political elites and the public. Iosifidis and Wheeler (2018) considered how 
politicians have employed the social media to affect major changes in recent US 
Presidential campaigns and the European Union (EU) Referendum. In particular, in 
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the 2016 UK Referendum, social media networks became a vehicle for contested 
political arguments and ‘post-truth’ positions defined mainly the Leave camp. For 
example, it was claimed that the UK Independence Party former leader Nigel Farage’s 
anti-migrant tweets influenced many voters. In the 2016 US Presidential election, the 
victorious celebrity property tycoon Donald Trump maintained a controversial online 
presence. He posted tweets about his campaign and engaged in a blatantly hateful 
online discourse aimed at his political opponents. Such a usage of the social media 
does not aid democratic representation, but instead it contributes to a greater 
destabilisation of modern politics. Therefore, the spread of disinformation has to do 
both with technological processes but also motivated political actors. 
Despite the severity of the aforementioned allegations of information warfare 
occurring on such a significant and instantaneous network, little research work has 
been conducted with regards to overseeing social media and investigating the ways in 
which they facilitate populism narratives and the spread of fake news. As Freedman 
(2018) noted, policy silences made it easier for the rise of powerful and yet 
unaccountable digital intermediaries through whose channels travels the fake news. 
He argued that unregulated digital platforms, the pursuit of media coverage and the 
communication of rage are core to the growth of reactionary populisms and called for 
a new policy paradigm that is based not merely around ideas of freedom, access and 
accountability, but on the redistribution that is required to tackle the abuse of media 
power by large corporations. 
However, several problems arise when it comes to regulating social media. 
Restricting political speech is ultimately a violation of freedom of speech even if it is 
false. The main reason is because the state, ironically, will then have the power to use 
and decide what is true and what is false for its own political end (Timer, 2017). As 
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Feldman (2016) noted, “in the free marketplace of ideas, true ideas are supposed to 
compete with false ones until the truth wins”.  Facebook, as all online sites, is 
protected under The US Constitution’s First Amendment and freedom of speech 
principles more generally albeit calls for amendments more suited for fake news and 
digital communication (for an overview of these issues and a critique of First 
Amendment theory see Napoli, 2018).  Furthermore, through Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, all online sites have immunity when it comes to 
political discourse (Timer, 2017).   
As a result, the way in which Facebook regulates itself remains an important 
factor in regard to efforts that stifle online disinformation.  For a long time, the 
company had been criticized for not doing enough (Tufekci, 2016), yet following the 
2016 US presidential election it has been noticeably more active (Manjoo, 2017).  
 
ONLINE DISINFORMATION  
Disinformation is defined as “false, incomplete or misleading information that is 
passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country” (Shultz and 
Godson, 1984: 41).  Jowett and O’Donnell (2012) define disinformation as black 
propaganda because of its covert nature and use of false information.  The authors 
connect the term to what was once a KGB division known as dezinformatsia, devoted 
to black propaganda (23-24).  They further emphasize only a few years ago 
disinformation spread across US print media, “to weaken adversaries and [were] 
planted in newspapers by journalists who are actually secret agents of a foreign 
country” (24).   
Recent studies on disinformation portray a similar picture.  Bennett and 
Livingston (2018: 124) define disinformation as “intentional falsehoods spread as 
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new stories or simulated documentary formats to advance political goals”.  
Humprecht’s definition (2018: 2) adds a profit motive describing disinformation as 
information that is intentionally created and uploaded on various websites, and 
thereafter disseminated via social media either for profit or for social influence.  The 
UK’s Disinformation and ‘fake news’ Report (DCMSC of the House of Commons, 
2019: 7) similarly defines disinformation as, “the deliberate creation and sharing of 
false and / or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead 
audiences, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or 
financial gain” and is in line with its European counterpart (European Commission, 
2018).  These definitions reflect the work of MIT political economists Benkler, Faris 
and Roberts (2018) who in a largescale study in the US have acknowledged five 
parties that circulate online disinformation.  These are: 
 
1. Bodies close to Russian government 
2. Right-wing groups 
3. Groups that make money such as those based in Macedonia 
4. Formal campaigns using marketing tools (i.e. Cambridge Analytica) 
5. Peer-to-peer distribution networks 
Despite efforts to fight back against online disinformation its diffusion continues 
to progress as social media platforms expand their user base and deviant initiators 
adapt to online changes.  Deepfakes, for example, a technique for human image 
synthesis based on artificial intelligence, can create audiovisual and audio content 
identical to real people.  One can imagine during times of unrest how deepfakes could 
swing opinions one way or another.   
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The facilitating factor of today’s online usage can be traced back to the rubric 
of ‘digital capitalism’ (Schiller, 1999).  Users connect to online market systems 
designed to maintain user attention that results in an ominous rise in online behavioral 
addiction (see Wu, 2016 and Alter, 2017).  As an increasing number of users spend 
more time on social media, the likelihood of disinformation getting shared also rises.  
Here, the content is considered misinformation since the senders do not know the 
original story is fake (DCMSC of the House of Commons, 2019).  Deviant 
disinformation agents intentionally make these stories more engaging via emotional 
appeal, making users to more willingly share it (D’Ancona, 2017).   
Disinformation is endemic to digital networks.  Carlson (2018) postulates that 
digital technologies accentuate societal deviancies such as disinformation and that 
technology itself develops into the main culprit against an existing moral order.  
Indeed, Jowett and O’Donnell (2012: 159) note, “the very ‘democracy’ and 
accessibility of the World Wide Web has made it the most potent force for the 
spreading of disinformation yet devised”.  Facebook, primarily a technology 
company, becomes the possessor of social deviance online.  As this happens news 
media are conversely converted into those institutions upholding moral order.  As 
online disinformation continues to generate moral panics news media paradoxically 
reclaim legitimacy as the institutions best suited to uphold contemporary public 
spheres (Boyd-Barrett, 2019).  Yet ironically, news media are heavily reliant on social 
media platforms.  Most of them have constructed multiplatform options that includes 
forming a social media presence (Ju, Jeong and Chyi, 2014; Hagvar, 2019).  Revenues 
raised from news media websites are linked to eyes on screen; therefore, all major 
publishers create Facebook pages in an effort to drive traffic from the social media 
platform to their own websites.  The result is Facebook’s growing influence in news 
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consumption.  According to the New York Times, Facebook ‘has become the largest 
and most influential entity in the news business, commanding an audience greater 
than that of any American or European television news network, any newspaper or 
magazine in the Western world and any online news outlet’ (Manjoo, 2017).  Until 
news media publishers find other revenue sources their efforts to drive traffic from 
social media will continue as will the potential for disinformation and misinformation 
to spread through deviants portraying themselves as legitimate news media (Hagvar, 
2019).  News media’s use of social media also adds to the obfuscation of content 
misinterpreted as fake.  In Tandor, Lim and Ling’s (2018: 141) typology of fake 
news, they include news satire and parody.  Jaster and Lanius (2018: 214-15) add 
journalistic errors and highly selective reporting to the list.  We can further add 
opinion pieces that social media machine learning might identify as bad content and 
therefore make it easier for deviants to cloak their own content under these categories.  
By broadening the context of online disinformation across an ever-expanding news 
ecosystem (Picard, 2014) the presence of digital news media on social media 
platforms might in fact contribute to the threat of online disinformation.   
 
FACEBOOK, STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS AND DISINFORMATION 
As illustrated, Facebook’s impact in contemporary life is unequivocal.  
Launched only 15 years ago, at the time of writing, it reaches over two billion people 
every month, while 1.2 billion users visit the platform daily.  In other words, 
Facebook is currently the internet’s most visited website both in terms of viewed 
pages and time spent.  Because of its influence, and as we have portrayed above, 
Facebook has come under scrutiny for its potential to be used to spread inappropriate 
content rapidly and globally.  The platform has been used to promote violent acts of 
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terrorism, distort presidential election results, influence perceptions and sway public 
opinion during important democratic moments.  The claim that Pope Francis had 
endorsed Mr. Trump for president, although fake, was shared nearly a million times 
(Isaac, 2016). 
A large number of fake Facebook pages and accounts acting as sources of 
disinformation are suspected of having ties with Russian and Iranian entities and 
come with specific agendas therefore creating a form of ‘information warfare’ 
through Facebook.  In the UK the government has accused Russia of meddling in 
elections by spreading disinformation (DCMSC of the House of Commons, 2019).  
According to the Washington Post (Priest, Jacoby and Bourg, 2018), Facebook was 
warned by several activists, civil society organisations and journalists from around the 
world about such cases but the tech giant was palpably slow to act.  In fact, several 
former employees of Facebook admitted they knew about these cases but could do 
little about it (DCMSC of the House of Commons, 2019).   
Facebook’s privacy tribulations began as early as 2006 with its introduction of 
newsfeed (Tufekci, 2018), but it was not till it became a publicly traded company on 
18 May 2012 that corporate pressure mounted.  That same day, the one-time startup 
built and designed by a twenty-year-old Mark Zuckerberg in his Harvard dorm room 
less than ten years earlier, became the world’s largest valuated company at $US104 
billion.  Tacit and explicit investor pressure was immediate as its share price 
plummeted the moment trading commenced.  The sudden drop in its share price 
resulted in several lawsuits and a severe hit to the company’s reputation.  57 per cent 
of the shares sold at the time were from Facebook insiders, while GM notably 
withdrew 10 million dollars of its advertising budget due to its lack of confidence in 
how effective Facebook’s advertising services were (Walton, 2018).  With investor 
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pressure growing, Facebook needed to quickly find ways to increase revenues.  As a 
consequence, the very same year it went public it pivoted from an online payment for 
games and applications to an advertising-driven business model delivered mainly on 
smart phones (DCMSC of the House of Commons, 2019: 26).  In order to achieve this 
Facebook began to harvest personal information from its users that could in turn be 
used to apply more targeted advertising messages.  User information was allowed to 
be used by app developers (for a price), that in turn led to the 2018 Cambridge 
Analytica data scandal (Rosenberg, Confessore and Cadwalladr, 2018).  As described 
in the DCMSC report (2019: 41), Ashkan Soltani, former Chief Technologist to the 
US Federal Trade Commission, gave a damning report regarding his definition of 
Facebook: “it is either free – there is an exchange of information that is non-monetary 
– or it is an exchange of personal information that is given to the platform, mined, and 
then resold to or reused by third-party developers to develop apps, or resold to 
advertisers with advertisers”.     
In spite of the damage to its reputation, particularly in the wake of the well-
documented 2018 Cambridge Analytica incident, the organisation has continued to 
prosper. It recently announced better than expected results in earnings and revenue as 
well as in its continued growth in users (Wong, 2019).  In fact, the company has 
steadily grown every year since it went public.  At the time of writing Facebook has a 
market capitalization of $US477 billion (YahooFinance, 2019).  With such influence, 
the company has entered a phase that requires it to be more transparent but also more 
responsible towards its investors and stakeholders.  As a Fortune 100 company 
Facebook finds itself constantly having to manage its reputation and investor 
expectations (see Nicoli and Papadopoulou, 2017), while still being seen as the 
company ‘that connects the world’.  This is a difficult feat for any public company let 
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alone a social media platform used by almost half the world’s population.  
Exacerbating the scrutiny is the rise in demand for innovation journalism and 
technology news (Gynnild, 2013), whereby audiences seek to consume news relating 
to technology companies and disruptive digital transformations. 
As a publicly traded company Facebook adheres to several Securities and 
Exchange Commission regulations regarding how it discloses information.  The 
company is expected to keep, among several credentials, archives of annual reports, 
quarterly earnings, valuations and communication that are sent out to news media 
often in the form of its own news releases.  Most public companies do so 
transparently, keeping archives on their websites often in the form of a dedicated 
newsroom that stores all announcements.  Facebook is no exception. As a Silicon 
Valley company with huge cultural significance, it might even be expected to 
innovate in how it communicates to its stakeholders and certainly in how it 
contributes to society (Nicoli and Komodromos, 2019).  As such, the company’s 
newsroom (newsroom.fb.com) is considerably rich in content.  It has eight tabs 
(home, news, company info, directory, media gallery, inside feed, public policy and 
investor relations), a search directory and an email for inquiries (press@fb.com).   
 
METHODOLOGY 
The research question of this study is: 
RQ: What are Facebook’s announcements on tackling online disinformation, 
misinformation, false news and fake news? 
Research Design       
In order to assess the research question two qualitative umbrella approaches 
are considered, discourse analysis and content analysis.  The strength of discourse 
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analysis lies in how it comprehends the way social power is abused and inequality is 
enacted (see for example Van Dijk, 1997).  The constructivist nature of discourse 
analysis highlights a subjective understanding of the analysed data in which 
assumptions are not only made, they are encouraged.  According to Schreier (2012: 
45), “one of the basic assumptions underlying discourse analysis is that language does 
not represent reality, but that it contributes to the construction of reality, and to the 
construction of social reality in particular”.  On the other hand, the origins of content 
analysis lie in Harold Lasswell’s classic communication process of who says what to 
whom and with what effect (Bloor and Wood, 2006).  The method offers a realist 
perspective whereby assumptions about reality are avoided and therefore data is seen 
more for what it sets out to be from its encoder.  Qualitative content analysis is used, 
in this study too, as a systematic coding and categorization approach for exploring 
and interpreting large amounts of textual data to determine, in an unobtrusive manner, 
patterns of words used, their frequency, their relationships and their structures of 
communication (Vaismoradi et al., 2013: 400).   
Data Collection       
The collected data draws on the period 16 November 2016 and 4 March 2019.  
The following words are examined separately in four different searches across the 
aforementioned time period: disinformation, misinformation, false news and fake 
news.  The four searches yielded 108 results that were categorized as 108 units of 
analysis (UOA 1-108).  A sample of the results of the search are illustrated in 
Appendix A. 
The results include a Zuckerberg post (UOA 1), a Facebook whitepaper (UOA 
13), a large-scale interview of Mark Zuckerberg by well-known journalist and blogger 
Ezra Klein in vox.com (UOA 33), and an interview with Chris Cox in Wired 
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Magazine (UOA 57).  Zuckerberg’s Facebook post is a 16 November 2016 
pronouncement on Facebook and misinformation, while the white paper titled, 
‘Information Operations and Facebook’ covers, in an overarching manner, the way in 
which Facebooks handles bad content.  Several of the Facebook announcements are 
responses to news media criticism in which we consider in our analyses.  Others are 
short text with links to further sources of information or in-house videos that were all 
investigated and considered in the analyses.  The time period chosen for analysis 
begins with Zuckerberg’s 2016 post since it is a seminal announcement a week 
following Donald Trump’s win in the 2016 presidential elections.   
Data Analysis 
The Coding Frame: The Three Dimensions 
In order to structure the study to address the research question three 
dimensions (main categories) are applied to classify and interpret the 108 units of 
analysis.  These are: proactive announcements directly dealing with tackling online 
disinformation, reactive announcements and discussion pieces and residual 
announcements (miscellaneous announcements that do not fit in the other two, see 
Schreier, 2012).  As illustrated, one of the key criticisms of Facebook has been that it 
does not respond soon enough (if at all) to accounts of disinformation occurring on its 
platforms.  Indeed, in front of congress Zuckerberg noted that “Facebook needs to 
take a more proactive role in issues such as fake news” (CNET, 2018).  If Facebook is 
taking proactive steps in combating disinformation, then a self-reforming approach 
can be warranted, and we might easier conclude that Facebook is taking steps to 
combat disinformation.   
Subcategories for the analysis are chosen in a data-driven (inductively) 
manner whereby categories emerge from the analyzed content (see Schreier 2012: 
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60).  A concept-driven (deductively) approach is avoided since theories and 
approaches in combating disinformation are still unclearly defined.  Had a concept-
driven approach been used based on our own understanding of how disinformation 
can be combated, subcategories might have incorrectly been placed or missed 
altogether.  Similarly, in regards the reactive announcements, we could not anticipate 
what, how and by whom Facebook would be reacting to, therefore its dimension’s 
sub-categories are also created solely on a data-driven inductive approach emerging 
from the content.  Appendix B illustrates Dimension 1 and its ten subcategories 
(D1.1-D1.10), Appendix C, Dimension 2 with eight subcategories (D2.1-D2.8) and 
Appendix D, Dimension 3, seven subcategories (D3.1-D3.7).  As illustrated in Chart 
1., the majority of the content analysed is categorized and coded in D1 showing the 
proactive manner in which Facebook is attempting to combat disinformation.  D2 and 
D3 yielded less results that were considered in our analyses far less significant than 
D1.   
 
Please insert Figure 1 here 
 
Findings and Sub-Categories 
The following subcategories emerge from the three dimensions we designed in 
our content analyses.   
Dimension 1 (Appendix B): Proactive Announcements Directly Dealing with Tackling 
Disinformation (D1): Total of 79 Announcements  
D1.1: Generic - All articles that fall into this category address a wider picture of what 
Facebook is announcing in terms of proactively tackling disinformation on its 
platforms.  These articles list a series of Facebook actions without going into much 
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detail regarding each one.  Zuckerberg’s own post in 2016 (UOA 1) does precisely 
this whereby he lists the areas Facebook is working on in how it tackles 
disinformation.  Overall, this was the largest of the subcategories with 32 of 79 
dimension one announcements.   
 
D1.2: Penalizing Content (In Newsfeed) – Facebook does not remove all suspicious 
and bad content; it rather feels enough is done if such content is penalized to a lower 
ranking on its newsfeed.  Thousands of pieces of information in the form of Facebook 
posts are displayed on users’ timelines yet on average only around 300 are scrolled 
and viewed.  Facebook identifies several bad practices that it penalizes to a lower rank 
in its users’ newsfeeds.  These are, clickbaits, ad farms, sensationalism pieces and 
misinformation.  It also chooses to block Facebook pages from been seen from 
advertising if they are sharing stories detected as false either by other users or third-
party checking organisations.  D1.2 had four dedicated announcements of the 79 in 
dimension one.    
 
D1.3: Related Articles Quality – On 20 December 2017 Facebook announced it would 
be using related articles instead of disputed flags for posts that have been detected as 
false.  As the company notes, it is to help users receive more context about a story by 
putting related articles next to a false news story.  This according to Facebook leads to 
less shares than disputed flags and therefore less misinformation.  Flagging a post 
actually leads to more shares so related articles is a more appropriate way of dealing 
with the disputed article without having to take it down.  Our search (using the four 
keywords) yielded one dedicated announcement albeit it should be noted that in a 
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separate search on ‘related articles’ further announcements on the topic were 
displayed.   
 
D1.4: Disrupting Economics of Disinformation Operations – This subcategory was 
identified in Facebook’s generic announcements on disinformation (D1.1).  In them it 
has shown it is combating organizations that attempt to generate money by posting 
bad content.  This is done by detecting through third-party checking organizations, 
advertising policies and by applying machine learning.  Our analyses did not yield 
any dedicated announcements on the topic.   
 
D1.5: Building New Products – Although there is a palpable overlap with other 
subcategories (e.g. ‘related articles’ is a new product), these were announcements we 
felt were worthy of a category.  New products include mechanisms of transparency of 
(political) advertising, encouraging local news publishers, detection products (D1.9), 
and new security protection measures for political campaigns (see also 1.10).  The ads 
transparency tool allows users to visit Facebook pages and to see what ads the 
advertiser is running and whether or not they are shown to the user.  D1.5 had four 
dedicated announcements of the 79 in dimension one.   
 
D1.6: Facebook Verification – Facebook has created a page verification (blue flag) 
procedures that offers further accountability regarding the publishers of Facebook 
pages.  In parallel to this the company has improved the verification of naming (users, 
groups and pages) and therefore minimizing fake names.  This subcategory yielded 
two dedicated announcements.     
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D1.7: Removing Content and Offenders – Facebook has identified certain violations 
that sanction the company from removing the content.  These include cloaking, 
repeatedly sharing fake news from detecting mechanisms, taking down fake accounts 
such as those linked with the Internet Research Agency (Kremlin linked troll group) 
often with the help of tip offs from stakeholders (e.g. third-party fact checkers) or 
government institutions (e.g. FBI), coordinated inauthentic behaviour and violations 
of its community standards (violence and criminal behaviour, objectionable content, 
respect of intellectual property etc.).  Cloaking is when violators disguise the true 
destination of an advertisement or post in order to bypass the review processes 
implemented by Facebook.   Coordinated inauthentic behaviour is when networks of 
accounts or pages corroborate to mislead who they are and what they are doing.  D1.7 
yielded 19 dedicated announcements.   
 
D1.8: Reaching Out to Stakeholders and Establishing Partnerships (Excluding Third-
Party Fact Checkers) – Facebook has set up partnerships and projects with various 
stakeholders and institutions regarding how it combats disinformation.  These include 
news media (e.g. the Facebook Journalism Project promoting news literacy and 
training), government authorities, other technology companies via a procedure known 
as threat exchange, and a partnership with the Think Tank Atlantic Council in order to 
assist in identifying real-time insights on emerging threats.  D1.8 yielded one 
dedicated announcement.   
 
 D1.9: Detection – This subcategory involves how Facebook detects disinformation.  
The manner in which it detects disinformation is by machine learning classifiers 
(feeding a computer with examples of bad content to find itself patterns), using a 
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number of independent third-party fact-checkers from around the world, easy 
reporting mechanisms designed for users, artificial intelligence and computer vision 
technologies, partnering with election integrity teams on an ad hoc basis during 
elections around the world (see also D1.10) and using trustworthy surveys.  Our 
analyses yielded 10 dedicated announcements within this subcategory.   
 
D1.10: Election Tools – Facebook has taken various measures to protect democratic 
processes from significant elections from around the world using technologies and 
teams.  Technologies include issues tabs on candidate pages, candidate info tools, 
vote planning tools, ad hoc fact-checkers and war rooms set up with Facebook teams 
from across various departments (e.g. war rooms were set up for the Brazil and US 
midterm elections with specialists from numerous departments such as security and 
communication).  Overall, five announcements were found that fell into this 
subcategory.   
 
Please insert Figure 2 here. 
 
Dimension 2 (Appendix C): Reactive Announcements and Discussion (D2): Total of 
18 Announcements  
Announcements coded into this dimension do not declare actual approaches 
regarding how Facebook fights back against disinformation.  These announcements 
rather prompt discussion on disinformation or respond to previous announcements or 
criticisms.  Furthermore, much of the content from D2 does not prioritize 
disinformation but is rather a part of another topic.  Chart 3. illustrates the breakdown.  
Almost half the announcements involve a series of discussions with academics, 
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intellectuals and Facebook employees on the role of social media and democracy; 
within these announcements the topic of disinformation is deconstructed under a 
larger picture of social media’s role in democracy.  The second most popular 
announcements here involve the way in which Facebook responded to articles 
published in popular news media.  UOA 86 for example disputes several 
‘inaccuracies’ of a New York Times article published on 14 November 2018 
addressing issues of ongoing Russian investigations, Facebook’s connection to a 
public affairs agency (Definers), whether President Trump’s comments broke 
community standards, Facebook’s commitment to fighting fake news and other 
issues.   
 
Please insert Figure 3 here. 
Dimension 3 (Appendix D): Residual Announcements (D3): Total of 11 
Announcements 
Dimension 3 yielded 11 results from the 108 units of analyses (see chart 4).  
These were broken down into seven subcategories that consisted of announcements in 
which the four keywords were not at all a priority of the announcement.   
 
Please insert Figure 4 here. 
 
DISCUSSION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Facebook endevours to combat disinformation by tweaking technologies and 
policies of how users spend time on the platform.  Detection and categorization of bad 
content are Facebook’s most common approaches to achieving this; both require 
machine learning and AI to assist human moderation, especially in regard to photos 
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and video fact-checking.  Facebook has not announced in any detail the connection 
between human moderation and machine learning AI approaches to identifying 
disinformation.  In listing the weaknesses of AI and machine learning, Scharre notes 
“if the data don’t represent the system’s operating environment well, the system can 
fail in the real world…AI systems can go from supersmart to superdumb in an 
instant” (2019).  Areas of study where AI systems of detection need to improve are in 
how to treat satire, opinion pieces, deepfakes and cloaking since these seem to be 
common ways deviant initiators will attempt to share fake news on Facebook.   
Throughout the analysis Facebook identified itself as not being an arbiter of 
truth, no doubt having the First Amendment and Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act in mind.  By doing so the company is showing its reluctance to remove 
content from its platforms even when it knows it is bad.  It rather sets community 
standards and policies sanctioning itself to categorize content and penalize it by 
lowering its rank.  This too is one area which requires more research since setting 
specific guidelines from regulators (or amending the First Amendment) might help 
social media platforms remove bad content altogether.  The caveat here is that a 
balance is required in regulating content without threatening universal freedoms of 
expression.  Finally, more exploration is needed in disrupting the financial flows of 
disinformation operations but also of coordinated inauthentic behaviour for 
ideological purposes.  This could be through myth-busting, applying international 
pressure and strategic communication against deviant actors.     
 
Conclusion  
Social media are rife with opportunities for those who seek to destabilize 
societies through disinformation either for ideological purposes, financial gains or 
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both, particularly before elections.  This occurs even in mature democracies as we 
have illustrated the connection between populist movements in liberal democracies 
triggered by deviant actors sharing disinformation on social media platforms.   
Regardless of whether they are to blame, social media are certainly used as 
accelerants for swaying public perceptions in directions that meet specific agendas or 
divide people through tribal discourse where users’ biases are confirmed through 
selective exposure.   
Online disinformation needs to be identified as a multifaceted problem; one 
that requires multiple approaches to resolve.   Governments, regulators, think tanks, 
the academy and technology providers need to join forces to better shape the next 
internet with as less online disinformation as possible.  While some level of self-
regulation is applied at Facebook there seems to be too much reliance on AI systems 
to detect bad content.  If this is countered with bad content that is also created by AI 
systems then it might not suffice to counter disinformation particularly when it comes 
in the form of satire, opinion pieces and deepfakes.  In such cases one wonders 
whether human moderation (e.g. fact-checkers) is enough on a platform as large as 
Facebook.  Also, might the First Amendment and Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act be amended in order to allow social media to take more actions on 
dubious content in a shorter amount of time?   
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APPENDIX A (SAMPLE OF UNITS OF ANALYSIS UOA 1-7) 
 
 
UOA TITLE / UNIT OF ANALYSIS HEADLINE  DATE SEARCH KEYWORD SOURCE 
1 
Zuckerberg post 
“A lof of you have asked what we're doing about 
misinformation” 
16/11/2016 on post truth 
Mark 
Zuckerberg FB 
post 
2 
Addressing Hoaxes and Fake News 
We’re committed to doing our part to address 
the issue of fake news and hoaxes on Facebook. 
15/12/2016 Fake news NEWSROOM 
3 
Continuing Our Updates to Trending 
We’re announcing three updates to Trending, a 
feature that shows people popular topics being 
discussed on Facebook that they might not see 
in their News Feed. 
25/01/2017 Fake news NEWSROOM 
4 
A New Educational Tool Against 
Misinformation 
False news and hoaxes are harmful to our 
community and make the world less informed. 
06/04/2017 Misinformation / False News NEWSROOM 
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5 
Working to Stop Misinformation and False 
News 
We know people want to see accurate 
information on Facebook – and so do we. 
06/04/2017 Misinformation / False News NEWSROOM 
6 
Reducing Links to Low-Quality Web Page 
Experiences 
We hear from our community that they’re 
disappointed when they click on a link that leads 
to a web page containing little substantive 
content and that is covered in disruptive, 
shocking or malicious ads. 
10/05/2017 Misinformation / False News NEWSROOM 
7 Verified Pages and Profiles https://www.facebook.com/animalyouth?fref=ts 29/05/2017 Fake news NEWSROOM 
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APPENDIX B: DIMENSION 1 - Proactive announcements directly dealing with tackling disinformation  
SUB-CATEGORY TITLE CODE UNITS OF ANALYSIS % 
GENERIC D1.1 
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 38,42, 44, 45, 
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 58, 65, 79, 85, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 
107 41% 
PENALIZING CONTENT (IN NEWSFEED) D1.2 7, 10, 11, 27 5% 
RELATED ARTICLES QUALITY D1.3 17 1% 
DISRUPTING ECONOMICS OF DISINFORMATION 
OPERATIONS D1.4 
 
0% 
BUILDING NEW PRODUCTS D1.5 32, 51, 57, 72, 90 6% 
FACEBOOK VERIFICATION D1.6 8, 19 3% 
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REMOVING CONTENT AND OFFENDERS D1.7 
12, 13, 56, 61, 62, 66, 67, 75, 80, 82, 84, 87, 91, 94, 95, 
100, 101, 103, 105 24% 
REACHING OUT TO STAKEHOLDERS & 
ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS D1.8 108 1% 
DETECTION D1.9 21, 33, 37,43, 53, 54, 55, 70, 71, 76 13% 
ELECTION TRACKING D1.10 52, 60, 73, 77, 81 6% 
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APPENDIX C: DIMENSION 2 - Reactive announcements & Discussion pieces 
SUB-CATEGORY TITLE CODE UNITS OF ANALYSIS % 
RUSSIAN ADS D2.1 15 6% 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY D2.2 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 36, 83, 93 44% 
RESEARCH AT FACEBOOK FOR CREATING NEW PRODUCTS D2.3 59 6% 
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AND TRANSPARENCY REPORTING D2.4 39 6% 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FACEBOOK  D2.5 63, 64 11% 
WOMEN AT FACEBOOK D2.6 68A/B 6% 
RESEARCH ON LESS DISINFORMATION ON FACEBOOK D2.7 78 6% 
RESPONDING TO CRITISISM D2.8 86A/B, 88, 92A/B/C 17% 
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APPENDIX D: DIMENSION 3 - Residual Announcements 
SUB-CATEGORY TITLE CODE UNITS OF ANALYSIS % 
PERSONAL WELL-BEING AND FACEBOOK USAGE D3.1 18, 74, 106 27% 
PREVENTION OF HARASSMENT AND BULLYING D3.2 20 9% 
COMMUNITY LEADERS D3.3 28 9% 
BAD CONTENT D3.4 40, 41 18% 
SUICIDE AND AI D3.5 69 9% 
HOW FACEBOOK WORKS D3.6 3, 89 18% 
D3.7 WHAT KIND OF INTERNET DO WE WANT D3.7 96 9% 
 
